State of Utah v. Heather Richards : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2008
State of Utah v. Heather Richards : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Edward Stone; Counsel for Appellant.
Marian Decker; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Attorney General; Augusts G. Chin;
Counsel for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Richards, No. 20080855 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1225
Case No. 20080855 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 




Brief of Appellee 
Appeal from convictions for possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to distribute, in the Third District Judicial District Court of 
Utah, Summit County, the Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck presiding. 
EDWARD STONE 
The Stone Law Firm 
5532 Lillehammer Lane 
Park City, Utah 84098 
Counsel for Appellant 
MARIAN DECKER (5688) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
AUGUSTS G. CHIN 
Deputy Summit County Attorney 
Counsel for Appellee 
Oral Argument Requested 
Case No. 20080855 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 





Brief of Appellee 
Appeal from convictions for possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to distribute, in the Third District Judicial District Court of 
Utah, Summit County, the Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck presiding. 
EDWARD STONE 
The Stone Law Firm 
5532 Lillehammer Lane 
Park City, Utah 84098 
Counsel for Appellant 
MARIAN DECKER (5688) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
AUGUSTS G. CHIN 
Deputy Summit County Attorney 
Counsel for Appellee 
Oral Argument Requested 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 8 
ARGUMENT 
TROOPER JENSEN HAD REASONABLE SUSPICION TO BRIEFLY 
EXTEND THE TRAFFIC STOP FOR A CANINE SNIFF WHERE HE 
DETECTED AN OVERWHELMING ODOR OF AIR FRESHENER, 
SAW OTHER ODOR MASKING AGENTS, AND ALSO SAW THAT 
DEFENDANT, THE SOLE VEHICLE OCCUPANT, HAD TWO CELL 
PHONES 8 
CONCLUSION 17 
ADDENDUM A: Memorandum Decision 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) 16 
Devenpeckv. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004) 16 
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) 9 
Meuhler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005) 9 
Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978) 16 
State v. Salzano, 158 F.3d 1107 (10th Cir. 1998) 12 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1998) 9,10,11 
United States v. Arana-Duarte, 244 Fed. Appx. 121,2007 WL 1852139 
(9th Cir. 2007) 13 
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) 10 
United States v. Farias, 43 F.Supp.2d 1276 (D. Utah 1999) 13,14 
United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 57 F.3d 895 (10th Cir. 1995) 12 
United States v. Jeter, 175 Fed. Appx. 261, 2006 WL 1266523 
(10th Cir. 2006) 12,13 
United States v. Newland, 246 Fed. Appx. 180,2007 WL 1655558 
(4th Cir. 2007) 13 
United States v. Ray, 973 F.2d 840 (10th Cir. 1992) 12 
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985) 11,16 
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) 9 
United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359 (10th Cir. 1989) 12 
ii 
United States v. Villa-Chaparro, 115 F.3d 797 (10th Cir. 1997) 12 
United States v. West, 219 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2000) 12 
United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2001) 11 
STATE CASES 
Flood v. State, 2007 WY167,169 P.3d 538 12 
State v. Alvarez, 2006 UT 61,147 P.3d 425 11 
State v. Applegate, 2008 UT 63,194 P.3d 925 16 
State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95,103 P.3d 699 2 
State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 63 P.3d 650 9,11,16 
State v. Hechtle, 2004 UT App 96, 89 P.3d 185 12 
State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94,100 P.3d 1222 1 
State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994) 9 
State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26,112 P.3d 507 10,11 
State v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157 (Utah App. 1997) 3 
State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, 78 P.3d 590 11,16,17 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-710 (West 2004) 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-711 (West 2004) 2,3,4 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (West 2004 & Supp. 2007) 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 (West 2008) 1 
i i i 
Case No. 20080855 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 





Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for possession of a controlled substance 
(marijuana) with intent to distribute. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did Trooper Jensen have reasonable suspicion to briefly extend the traffic stop 
for a canine sniff where he detected an overwhelming odor of air freshener, 
observed other odor-masking agents, and saw that defendant— the sole occupant— 
had two cell phones? 
Standard of Review. The appellate court reviews for clear error the factual 
findings underlying a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress. 
State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, ^ 11, 100 P.3d 1222. The trial court's legal 
conclusions are reviewed non-deferentially for correctness, including ils application 
of the legal standard to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, % 15,103 P.3d 699. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. CONST. Amend IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Charge. Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance 
(marijuana) with intent to distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 58-37-8 (West 2004 & Supp. 2007); improper lane travel, a class C 
misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-710 (West 2004); and 
following to close, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-
711 (West 2004). Rl-3. 
Motion to suppress denied. Defendant moved to suppress sixty pounds of 
marijuana found in the trunk of her car on the ground that she was detained 
without reasonable suspicion. R40-49; see also R56-60. An evidentiary hearing was 
held on 7 April 2008. See R55. The trial court denied the motion in a written 
Memorandum Decision. R67-77 (a copy is attached in addendum A). 
2 
Conditional guilty plea. Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, defendant 
pled guilty to the felony distribution charge, with the condition that she could 
challenge the trial court's ruling on appeal, and the other charges were dismissed. 
See R99-106. 
Sentence. The trial court imposed the statutory indeterminate term of zero to 
five years. Rl22-23. The trial court then stayed imposition of the prison term and 
placed defendant on probation for thirty-six months. Id. 
Timely notice of appeal. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R124-25. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
Shortly before 10:00 p.m. on 8 November 2007, Trooper Jensen, of the Utah 
Highway Patrol, was on duty in Summit County and observed a car traveling on I-
80 drift over the "fog" line separating the right side of the road from the dirt 
shoulder. R67-68 (a copy of the trial court's written Memorandum Decision is 
attached in the addendum). As he watched, the car then drifted into the passing 
lane to its left and remained one car length behind another car traveling in the left 
lane. R68. The trooper stopped the car based on these observations. R68; see also 
R55:5. 
1
 The facts are set forth in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. 
See State v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157,1158 (Utah App. 1997). 
3 
Defendant was the driver and sole occupant. R68. In response to the trooper's 
request, she produced a California driver's license and a registration in the name of 
another person. Id. Trooper Jensen asked where she was going, to which defendant 
replied she was driving to Minnesota to get her son. Id. When the trooper asked 
why she did not fly to Minnesota, defendant said that her son did not like to fly. Id. 
Seeing a picture of a four- or five-year-old child near the console, and believing from 
his own experience that young children like to fly, the trooper found defendant's 
response to be less than credible. Id. 
While obtaining defendant's documentation, Trooper Jensen noticed in the car 
a can of Armor All and a can of Lysol on the floor, several orange peels strewn on 
the floor and hanging out of containers, fast food items on the floor, two cell phones, 
and "a strong, overwhelming odor of air fresheners." Id. at 68-69.2 
Trooper Jensen ran a warrants check but found nothing amiss. R69. A second 
officer arrived and got out of his car as Trooper Jensen returned defendant's papers 
and instructed her on proper following distance. Id. He then asked if he could ask 
2
 At preliminary hearing, Trooper Jensen clarified that the first thing he 
smelled "was the oranges, and then it was the air fresheners." R54:27. He also 
noted that Armor All and Lysol have a strong fragrance, id. at 25, and that he was 
trained to look for all of the above items as possible indicators of criminal activity. 
Id. at 9,18. 
4 
her some questions, ana oejenLUiiii ,M,U S L->. :- •. ; - : \ ; * : -*" 
free to leave, .md she did notvisl i" " I rnoper Jensen's eanvniained parked behind 
defendant's with his emergency lights activated, and the second trooper was parked 
behind him. Id. Trooper Jensen first asked if defendant had any prescription drugs, 
weapons, or illegal substances, and defendant responded no. Id. He then askeo -A 
she had marijuana, methamphetamines, cocaine, neroi;., or ecstasv, an,, uoic; ...»..: 
again respe; , y i • i-v . ; . - . : ; -:• ' ^ * ; —>e 
sui'^Lances. d^f^^--^4--"• - ' ; -*'>* tV-1- - -tV -rd ] * • o^mussion to search the 
car, explaining that "he had no reason to search/7 Id. The trooper responded that he 
would have a drug dog run around the car, noting that a positive indication from 
the dog would give him probable cause to search the ca= i ne second trooper 
then ran his dog around defendant s car, smi::ng ano. :•_;._;LU .;::>;.:. • •• i -ar 
defendant dropped a "smoking pipe" in the process. Id. The troopers then opened 
the trunk and found approximately sixty pounds of marijuana. It1, 
Fourteen minutes passed from the beginning of the stop until the dot: 
indicated on uej^ndant s trunx. i\o;. Less ^n.in :,\\. _o\.;ic> :\i — e., . \„ 
5 
Trooper Jensen returned defendant's documents to when the drug dog alerted. 
R70.3 
Based on the above facts, the trial court determined that 1) defendant raised 
no challenge to the initial traffic stop, which was valid; 2) defendant was detained 
after the conclusion of the traffic stop, when Trooper Jenson returned her 
documents and continued to speak with her; but that 3) defendant's extended 
detention was justified by reasonable suspicion that she may be trafficking drugs. 
Id. at 71, 73-75. 
In so ruling, the trial court emphasized that Trooper Jensen " observed many 
indications of odor masking agents," including "an overwhelming odor of air 
fresheners," "a can of Lysol, a can of ArmorAll," and "orange peels." Id. at 74. 
Additionally, the trial court noted that Trooper Jensen saw two cell phones. Id. 
While these items "by themselves would not amount to any level of reasonable 
suspicion," the trial court recognized that viewed as a totality, and in light of the 
trooper's training and experience, the overwhelming odor of air freshener together 
with observations of other masking agents and two cell phones in defendant's sole 
3
 The trial court determined the timing based on the DVD recording of the 
traffic stop. See R68, 70; see also Exh. # 1. 
6 
possession, gave rise to ivasonc'.LMe -:;^M . • ••. r.d.:M -. nin \ing 
iitifi otics. LI. nil 74, vv i//s,» ,',/ ,if", 
\crordingly, this reasonable suspicion justified Trooper Jensen's brief 
extension of the traffic stop to ask defendant whether she was transporting 
narcotics: 
Given those objective indications of possible criminal activity often 
associated with controlled substances, the officer could temporarily 
detain defendant to quickly dispel or confirm those reasonable 
suspicions based on those articu lated factors, 
Id. at 74-75. . 
Because Trooper Jensen's reasonable suspicion "was not dispelled by the brief 
conversation" with vJelunuani, ..;... .i\^: , jur i ^ le rmined ;•.- • • . :^n 
d*>r^  .-- - .* i-;;g. • " ^ J defendant's car: 
; Trooper Jensen] took the most rational step of asking for consent, 
to quickly dispel or confirm the suspicion. When that consent was 
refused, the officer took the next reasonable step designed to quickly, 
at roadside with a mobile vehicle, dispel or justify and confirm his 
suspicion. That consisted of having a drug detection dog go around 
the vehicle quickly. 
7 
Finally, the canine alert gave rise to probable cause to search defendant's car, 
and the subsequent discovery of sixty pounds of marijuana in the trunk justified 
defendant's arrest. Id. at 75. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly ruled that defendant's further temporary detention 
following the completion of the traffic stop was justified by reasonable suspicion. 
Trooper Jensen reasonably suspected defendant was masking the odor of drugs in 
her car when he detected an overwhelming odor of air fresheners, observed 
numerous masking agents, including Lysol, Armor All, and orange rinds, and also 
saw two cell phones in defendant's sole possession. The trial court's ruling denying 
the motion to suppress should therefore be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
TROOPER JENSEN HAD REASONABLE SUSPICION TO BRIEFLY 
EXTEND THE TRAFFIC STOP FOR A CANINE SNIFF WHERE HE 
DETECTED AN OVERWHELMING ODOR OF AIR FRESHENER, 
SAW OTHER ODOR MASKING AGENTS, AND ALSO SAW 
THAT DEFENDANT, THE SOLE VEHICLE OCCUPANT, HAD 
TWO CELL PHONES 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in ruling that Trooper [ensen had 
reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop to question her about narcotics and to 
run a drug-detection dog around her car. Because her further detention was not 
supported by reasonable suspicion, defendant reasons, the trial court erred in 
8 
cnaiier^t-•- : •*- ! - h^t* >-r. .•:.*- •-- ^ , ~.aH^u-nicion lacks merit and 
should be rejected. 
It is well established that a "detention [incident to a traffic stop] 'must be 
temporary and last no \>nger than is necessary to effectuate the purpose oi the 
Cabal*. ^. ^ " i "i 40S : :~..-^ ,-^*>^; .-holdine su^nicionless canine sniff during 
routine traffic stop was reasonable where it did not prolong stop beyond time 
reasonably required to complete it); Meuhler v, Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100-101 (2005) 
(applying Caballes and holding officers may ask unrelated questions, so long as 
questions GO i\ut prolong aetemu . -;/*.:—_. / . < . j. „« ^wse of the ii litial 
1,' I I it.. E!1 person mi list I: e alio wed t : dep -i rt " 
"Unless an officer has probable cause or reasonable suspicion of a further illegality/' 
State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, *(j 31, 63 P.3d 650 (emphasis added). 
Reasonable suspicion of a further illegality arises when an officer artsc u iates 
facts supporting "that cnn*;nai ^,ti\ ;L\ mav oe aiu. ;. _./..;m ZJHU> L . >.,T --'•• 
U.S. U, J11:1: MHLiutii.t; / INI/ , «nJ U.S. at Wy thronl %itrr. Kohl.21U) I '1 v» \ | j , 
999 P 2d 7 "Ii lartici ilate 1 n inches"'7 will not do. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. On the other 
9 
hand, "the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for 
probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the 
evidence standard/7 United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002). Indeed, an 
officer is under no obligation to rule out innocent conduct prior to initiating, or as in 
this case, extending a traffic stop. See State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26,117,112 P.3d 
507 (citing Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277). "This is because the public interest in 
investigating criminal activity is sufficiently important to justify the minimal 
intrusion into personal security that such investigatory detentions entail/' Id. (citing 
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273). Simply put, there need only be articulable facts from which 
an officer can reasonably infer that criminal activity "may be afoot." See Terry, 392 
U.S. at 30. 
Moreover, when examining an investigatory stop, "it is imperative that the 
facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer 
at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in 
the belief that the action taken was appropriate?" Id. 21-22 (citations omitted). In 
assessing reasonable suspicion, "[c]ourts must view the articulable facts in their 
totality and avoid the temptation to divide the facts and evaluate them in isolation 
[from each other]." Markland, 2005 UT 26, \ 11 (case citation and quotation marks 
omitted). Reasonable suspicion must be evaluated based on the totality of the 
10 
circumstances confronting the officer at the time. See State v. Alverez, 2006 UT 61, f 
14,147 P.3d 425 (citing Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274). "Courts mus t . . . 'judge the officer's 
conduct in light of common sense and ordinary human experience and . . . accord 
deference to an officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious 
actions.'" Markland, 2005 UT 26, | 11 (quoting United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 
1262, 1268 (10th Cir. 2001)); accord State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, f1f 20-21 (courts 
should consider an officer's subjective assessment of facts). Finally, in a "swiftly 
developing situation," such as a traffic stop and investigation, courts "should not 
indulge in unrealistic second-guessing." United States v. Shaiye, 470 U.S. 675, 686 
(1985). 
Here, Trooper Jensen developed reasonable suspicion of further illegality 
during the traffic stop: He observed numerous masking agents in the passenger 
compartment (ArmorAll, Lysol, and orange rinds), two cell phones in defendant's 
sole possession, and detected an overwhelming odor of air freshener. R67-69, 74. 
Thus, defendant's "further temporary detention" after the traffic portion of the stop 
was concluded was justified by reasonable suspicion that she was involved in drug 
trafficking. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f 31. Far from an inarticulate hunch, Trooper 
Jensen's brief detention of defendant was based on objective facts that supported a 
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity "may be afoot." Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. 
11 
This Court has previously recognized that "the presence of multiple air 
fresheners [is an] accepted . . . factor that can support, when viewed in conjunction 
with other facts, the existence of reasonable suspicion of drug use or 
transportation/7 State v. Hechtle, 2004 UT App 96, | 13, 89 P.3d 185. The Tenth 
Circuit has also recognized that the smell of air freshener and other strong odors can 
support "reasonable suspicion on the part of law enforcement officials that the odor 
is being used to mask the smell of drugs/ ' State v. Salzano, 158 F.3d 1107,1114 (10th 
Cir. 1998); see also United States v. West, 219 F.3d 1171,1178-79 (10th Cir. 2000) (scent 
of air freshener); United States v. Villa-Chaparro, 115 F.3d 797, 802 (10th Cir. 1997) 
(strong smell of detergent and observation of detergent crystals); United States v. 
Hernandez-Rodriguez, 57 F.3d 895, 899 (10th Cir. 1995) (strong smell of perfume); 
United States v. Ray, 973 F.2d 840, 842 (10th Cir. 1992) (recognizing orange peels 
often used to mask odor of marijuana); United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359,362 (10th 
Cir. 1989) (strong smell of patchouli oil); accord Flood v. State, 2007 WY167, | 21,169 
P.3d 538 (strong odor of cologne). 
Some courts consider multiple air fresheners sufficient without more to 
support reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., United States v. Jeter, 175 Fed. Appx. 261, 
2006 WL 1266523 (10th Cir. 2006) ("presence of numerous air fresheners — in this 
case at least five —with differing scents, coupled with open rear windows and 
12 
additional unopened air fresheners'7 established reasonable suspicion). But here, in 
addition to the multiple masking agents (Lysol, ArmorAll, and orange peels) and 
the overwhelming odor of air fresheners, the officer observed two cell phones. 
While law-abiding people do carry multiple cell phones, they are common among 
drug dealers, and so may contribute to reasonable suspicion. See Jeter, 175 Fed. 
Appx. 261, 265 ("presence of multiple cell phones, while possibly innocuous 
considered in a vacuum, heightened the trooper's suspicion"); see also United States 
v. Newland, 246 Fed. Appx. 180,189, 2007 WL 1655558 (4th Cir. 2007) (multiple cell 
phones supported reasonable suspicion driver and sole occupant engaged in drug 
trafficking). This is because "drug couriers are often given a phone by drug dealers 
for use to stay in contact throughout the trip/7 United States v. Arana-Duarte, 244 
Fed.Appx. 121, 122, 2007 WL 1852139 (9th Cir. 2007) (three cell phones for two 
vehicle occupants supported reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking). Thus here, 
the presence of multiple masking agents, overwhelming smell of air fresheners, and 
an extra cell phone would have warranted a reasonable officer to suspect drug 
trafficking. 
United States v. Farias, 43 F.Supp.2d 1276 (D. Utah 1999), cited by defendant, 
bears little resemblance to this case. Farias involved no overwhelming odor of air 
fresheners, no observations of multiple masking agents, and no extraneous cell 
13 
phones. Rather, the government argued that Farias and his companions' extended 
detention was justified by the officer's observation of "a road atlas, fast food 
wrappers, and little luggage in the vehicle," where the occupants claimed to be on a 
cross-country trip to Iowa from California, and finally, the observation and smell of 
air fresheners. Id. at 1282. The district court rejected the government's argument, 
ruling that the smell of air freshener was "the strongest support for [the officer's] 
suspicion of criminal activity," but that the smell of air freshener was "neutralized" 
in that case because none of the other factors relied upon suggested criminality, and 
there was "no indication that the air fresheners were masking the odor of drugs." Id. 
at 1283. Here, in contrast, the presence of multiple masking agents, an extra cell 
phone, and the overwhelming smell of air fresheners reasonably suggested defendant 
was masking the odor of drugs. 
Finally, defendant cites examples of Trooper Jensen's testimony at the 
preliminary and suppression hearings and asserts that the trooper's "subjective 
belief and impressions at the time of the extension of the stop help to create an 
appropriate context in which whether reasonable suspicion existed is determined." 
Aplt. Br. at 11. According to defendant, Trooper Jensen testified that he "was 
searching for a reason to search the car, implying that he had no reason at that 
time." Aplt. Br. at 10 (citing R55:25 & "video"). Defendant also claims that the 
14 
trooper believed that defendant "was free to leave." Id. at 10-11 (citing R54:28 and 
R55:17). To the extent the record supports defendant's characterization of Trooper 
Jensen's testimony, his reliance thereon is unavailing.4 
Trooper Jensen never expressly testified that he did not believe that he had 
reasonable suspicion to further detain defendant. To the contrary, he testified that 
he believed he did have reasonable suspicion to briefly extend the traffic stop. See, 
e.g., R55:18-19. At most, the trooper's testimony supports that he did not believe 
that he had probable cause to conduct a warrantless automobile search. See R55:9-
10. Accordingly, as the trial court ruled, the trooper reasonably sought to confirm 
his suspicion that defendant was trafficking drugs by asking if the vehicle contained 
drugs and for consent to search— and when consent was refused — running a drug-
4
 Testimony that Trooper Jensen was allegedly looking for a reason to search 
does not appear at the record cite provided by defendant. See Aplt. Br. at 10 (citing 
R55/25 (video)). A DVD of the traffic stop was received into evidence at R55:25, but 
the DVD was not included in the record on appeal. However, at another point in 
the record, Trooper Jensen did testify that defendant asked him "what [his] reason 
to search was," and that he told her, "[he] did not have a reason." R55:9; see also id. 
at 10 ("I believe I asked her for a reason, if she had a reason or something like that. 
I'm asking [defendant] for the reason"). However, this conversation occurred prior 
to the canine sniff and alert. Id. 
Additionally, although Trooper Jensen testified that defendant "could have 
left" once the traffic portion of the stop was concluded, he also clarified that he 
would not in fact have allowed to her to leave at that time, because he suspected 
that she may be transporting narcotics. See R55:17-19; see also R54:28-29. 
15 
detection dog around the vehicle. See R74-75. The trooper's conduct here would 
have been unreasonable only if he had conducted a search before he had probable 
cause, or before the drug-detection dog alerted on defendant's trunk. Because the 
trooper diligently sought to confirm or dispel his reasonable suspicion of "further 
illegality/7 or that defendant may be transporting drugs, the "temporary further 
detention" of defendant for brief questioning and a canine sniff — all of which took 
less than five minutes — was justified. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, \ 31; R70,73-75; see also 
Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686. 
In any event, even assuming the record supported defendant's 
characterization of the trooper's testimony, the reasonableness of officer conduct is 
judged against an objective standard. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22; see also Scott v. 
United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137 (1978). An "officer's subjective motivation is 
irrelevant." Bngham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006); Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 
U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (officer's understanding of legal justification for action 
irrelevant); see also State v. Applegate, 2008 UT 63, ^ 20,194 P.3d 925 (lecognizing 
officer's "subjective understanding of the law is irrelevant"). While an officer's 
subjective interpretation of the facts is "one of several possible aritculable facts a 
court may consider as part of the totality of the circumstances," State v. Warren, 2003 
UT 36, f^ 21, 78 P.3d 590, it is not dispositive. Particularly where, as shown above, 
16 
the totality of the circumstances, including the presence of multiple masking agents, 
an extra cell phone, and overwhelming smell of air fresheners "'would warrant a 
[person] of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate/' 
Warren, 2003 UT 36, f 14 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted 6 May 2009. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HEATHER M. RICHARDS, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 071500331 
Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: May 21, 2008 
The above matter came before the court for decision on 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
BACKGROUND 
An information was filed on November 15, 2007, charging 
defendant with possession of a controlled substance, possession 
of drug paraphernalia and two traffic offenses, improper lane 
travel and following too close. After being bound over after a 
preliminary hearing on March 3, 2008, defendant filed a motion to 
suppress on March 26, 2008. An evidentiary hearing was held 
April 7, 2008, the court took the matter under advisement and 
allowed the parties to file further memoranda. Defendant filed a 
further memorandum May 2, 2008, the State filed its response May 
13, 2008. Oral argument was held May 19, 2008. The court took 
the issues under advisement. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Jason Jensen (Jensen) was on 
000067 
duty on November 8, 2007, at about 9:45 p.m, when he observed a 
vehicle on 1-80 traveling eastbound. The vehicle drifted over 
the NNfog" line, or solid line marking the outside of the lane 
separating the roadway from the dirt shoulder. Then the vehicle 
drifted into the fast, or left lane, and it was following another 
vehicle at the distance of one car length in that fast lane. 
Based on those observations Jensen stopped the vehicle at about 
mile post 148 and approached the passenger side. The event was 
captured and is on a DVD which was introduced into evidence and 
which has been viewed by the court. Ex. 1. 
2. Defendant was the driver and sole occupant. Jensen asked 
for license and registration and defendant produced a California 
driver license and a registration in the name of another person. 
3. Jensen asked where defendant was going and she said to 
get her son in Minnesota as he did not like to fly after Jensen 
asked why she was not flying. Jensen saw a photo of a four or 
five year old child, in the console area of the vehicle, and 
believed that explanation to be fanciful as it was his belief 
that any young child would like to fly and he based that on his 
experience that his own children like to fly. 
4. During this interchange of documents and conversation 
Jensen saw a can of Armor-All on the floor, several orange peels 
lying about on the floor and partially in and out of containers, 
a can of Lysol and fast food items on the floor. He also saw two 
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cell phones and the vehicle had a strong, overwhelming odor of 
air fresheners. 
5. Jensen ran a documents check and the license was valid 
and there were no warrants for defendant. He returned to 
defendant and returned her documents to her. He gave her some 
instructions on not following too closely, 
6. Jensen then asked defendant if he could ask some 
questions and she said yes. Jensen did not tell defendant she 
was free to leave nor did she ask if she could leave. He was 
parked behind her and his emergency lights were still engaged. 
Another officer had arrived and could not be seen on the camera 
but his voice could be heard and thus the court finds that the 
second officer was thus out if his vehicle when Jensen returned 
to defendant's vehicle. That other trooper was parked behind 
Jensen. Jensen asked defendant if she had any prescription drugs 
or weapons or illegal substances, then asked if she had 
marijuana, methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin, or ecstacy and she 
said no. He asked if she used such substances and she said no. 
He asked if he could search her vehicle and she said no. He asked 
why not and she responded that he had no reason to search. Jensen 
stated he was going to have a dog run around the vehicle and if 
it indicated that would be probable cause to search the vehicle. 
He asked her to roll up her window. 
7. The other trooper, Cole Douglas (Douglas) who had arrived 
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at the scene was asked to get his dog out as Jensen's dog was not 
working well that night. In fact Jensen had his own service 
animal in his, Jensen's vehicle. Douglas "ran" his drug 
detection dog around the vehicle defendant was driving. The dog 
alerted on the trunk area and placed his nose on the rear license 
plate and scratched at the area. 
8. Jensen then went to defendant and defendant, who was on 
the cell phone at the time telling someone she was being asked to 
get out of her car, to get out and as she did so she dropped an 
object onto the ground, and it was a smoking pipe. Jensen asked 
what that was and defendant said she was trying to hide it. 
9. The troopers opened the trunk and found a large amount of 
marijuana, about 60 pounds. They first searched the interior of 
the vehicle. 
10. The entire event, from the stop to the point the dog 
"hit" on the rear of the vehicle, took from 2143 hours to 2157 
hours, or 14 minutes. From the time Jensen returned the 
documents to defendant it was 4 minutes until the dog hit on the 
rear of defendant's vehicle according to the recording of the 
event. Thus, the claimed illegal detention in this case was the 




DISCUSSION and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Here the stop is not challenged and it was justified 
based on the driving pattern where defendant crossed over the fog 
line then followed another vehicle too closely. The actual search 
is not challenged and the only issue is whether there was 
sufficient objective suspicion to justify a detention beyond the 
traffic stop. 
2. As is the clear Utah law, as recently reflected in State 
v. Baker, 2008 UT App 115, a seizure occurs if in view of all the 
circumstances a reasonable person would have believed he was not 
free to leave. The State bears the burden of proving the 
reasonableness of the officer's actions during an investigative 
detention. The officer may detain the driver to conduct a limited 
investigation of the circumstances that caused the detention. 
The detention, if it exceeds the reason for the original traffic 
stop, must be temporary and necessary and must be based on 
reasonable suspicion the officer can articulate. The court looks 
to the totality of the circumstances to determine if there is an 
objective basis for suspecting criminal activity and for a 
continued detention. 
3. Here, obviously, the officer stopped the vehicle for 
traffic violations and in the legitimate course of that 
investigation observed facts that, at least to the officer, 
yielded suspicion sufficient to justify a further detention. Of 
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course the legal question is not whether this officer believed 
there was sufficient basis for the detention, but it is an 
objective question. The traffic issues had been resolved by that 
time after the officer legitimately obtained her documents, ran 
checks, and engaged in brief contestation about defendant's 
destination and travel. That conversation did not delay the 
already lawful stop. The issue clearly then is whether those 
observations objectively, as opposed to subjectively, amount to 
reasonable suspicion to justify the continued detention. 
4. Further, as to defendant's concerns about Jensen's 
"contradictory" statements about whether defendant was or was not 
free to leave, those feelings and testimony of Jensen, 
respectfully to Jensen, irrelevant. It is again an objective 
standard. A person is not detained because the officer oelieves 
there is a detention or testifies there is a detention, nor is 
the person free to leave because the officer believes or 
testifies she is free to leave. That determination is an 
objective one for the court. 
5. Once Jensen returned the documents to defendant she was 
either free to leave or detained. The State does not contend this 
was a consensual encounter and it was not, despite Jensen's 
possible belief and testimony she may have been free to leave. If 
a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave 
the person was seized. Here, the court concludes there was a 
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continued seizure. The officer was talking to defendant, his 
emergency lights were on in back of defendant's vehicle, there 
was another officer present, the officer was asking about drugs 
being in the vehicle, and the court concludes it is a rare 
person, when an officer is talking through a window to a driver, 
who would believe they are free to leave. It is true defendant 
did not ask if she could leave, but all the factors indicate to 
the court that defendant, as an objectively reasonable person, 
would not feel free to leave. Jensen did not tell defendant she 
was free to leave. That is not, of course, required for this to 
be a consensual encounter, but it remains a factor. In total here 
there is no indication that a reasonable person would have felt 
free to leave, and so the court concludes defendant was in fact 
detained after Jensen returned the documents to her and continued 
to speak with her. 
6. Here, the factors observed by Jensen are frequent and 
recurring and fairly "standard." Jensen believed the travel 
plans made little sense because defendant stated her son, 
approximately age 5, did not like to fly. While that may be 
unusual, it is not of course by itself unreasonable. The court 
concludes it is not a legitimate factor that the court considers 
as it was and is based on Jensen's personal experiences. While 
it may have been suspicious to Jensen, it is not a factor that 
adds anything, even in combination, with the other factors. 
-7-
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7. Jensen observed many indications of odor masking agents. 
Not only was there an overwhelming odor of air fresheners, but a 
can of Lysol, a can of Armor All, orange peels, and other air 
fresheners. There were two cell phones. Again, none of those by 
themselves would amount to any level of reasonable suspicion 
because many people have an air freshener, for example. Some, 
but probably few, may have two cell phones. But, based on 
training and experience, the strong and overwhelming odor, caused 
by at least 4 different odor-producing agents that were present, 
could reasonably and objectively be seen as masking agents for 
the odor of drugs. That, to this court, is an objective set of 
circumstances that justified the officer in asking questions, 
that is, further detaining defendant. Given those objective 
indications of possible criminal activity often associated with 
controlled substances, the officer could temporarily detain 
defendant to quickly dispel or confirm those reasonable 
suspicions based on those articulated factors. 
8. The suspicion was not dispelled by the brief 
conversation, so the officer took the most rational step of 
asking for consent, to quickly dispel or confirm the suspicion. 
When that consent was refused, the office took the next 
reasonable step designed to quickly, at roadside with a mobile 
vehicle, dispel or justify and confirm his suspicion. That 




9. That dog alerted on the vehicle and that gave the 
officers probable cause to initiate the search of the vehicle and 
further detain defendant. Of course once the 60 pounds of 
marijuana was found, there was probable cause to arrest. Again, 
the actual arrest is not challenged except the basic claim it was 
the product of an unlawful detention. If the temporary detention 
was unlawful, there is certainly no attenuation and the arrest 
would be unlawful. 
10. In combination and totality, the "odor'' factors amounted 
to reasonable suspicion to further detain defendant. She was not 
free to leave but was seized temporarily but that temporary 
detention was justified by the articulated reasonable suspicion 
the officer had. Defendant was not detained beyond the traffic 
stop prior to Jensen's learning all of the above information. 
11. Again, there is no challenge to anything but the 
legality of the detention. The court has found and concludes, 
there was a detention but it was lawful. 
The court DENIES the motion to suppress the results of the 
search. 
As noted in court, the matter is set for a status conference 
June 2, 2008. If the matter is to be set for trial at that time 
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defendant is to be present. If some further negotiations are to 
be undertaken defendant need not be present until either those 
negotiations are terminated and the matter is to be set for a 
change of plea or a trial. 
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other 
order is required. 
DATED this day of , 2008. 
BY THE COURT; 
<.<c,*'-va'x" 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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